Following US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's speech at the Munich Security Conference, which was assessed as more moderate and even conciliatory in terms of transatlantic relations, a de-escalation of the Washington-Brussels relationship was expected. All the more so because, unlike J.D. Vance's harsh speech in Munich last year, Rubio now emphasized common threats, especially Russian aggression, global instability, and security challenges that require a coordinated response from the US and Europe.
A key emphasis of Rubio's speech was NATO as the central axis of Western security. Rubio emphasized that the transatlantic partnership remains irreplaceable and that in economic-geopolitical terms, the United States sees Europe as a key strategic partner, not a weak ally. He spoke of the need for a common technological and economic strategy, especially in the context of competition with China and the restructuring of global supply chains.
Rubio did not fail to call for greater European responsibility in defense, but the impression remained that he carefully avoided confrontational rhetoric. Instead of direct criticism, Rubio formulated the message in terms of joint burden-sharing within the Alliance, which was interpreted as a diplomatically balanced approach.
Kaja Kallas's line: Europe is not weakening, it is a powerful partner!
But just when everyone was hoping that this kind of turnaround would bring new hope for improving relations between the US and the EU, the good old saying proved to be true - nothing is over until it's really over.
European foreign policy chief Kaia Kallas delivered a direct and rather sharp rebuttal to the narrative of "the decline of Europe" that had been running through the debate, albeit not in Rubio's speech, at the Munich Security Conference. Kallas explicitly rejected the thesis that Europe was in decline and emphasized that such assessments were politically, not factually, based, insisting that the EU remains an economically and institutionally stable global center of power.
Citing figures – GDP, market size and the European Union's trade weight – as a counterargument to the perception of European weakness, Kallas pointed out that Europe remains one of the largest economic blocs in the world and that its industrial, technological and regulatory power cannot be reduced to political clichés of "collapse".
She also indirectly signaled that European security policy should not be seen through the prism of dependence on the United States, but rather as a partnership. In that context, Kallas reiterated that European countries had significantly increased defense spending following Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which, she said, demonstrated the Union's strategic maturity.
Additionally, an important segment of her rhetoric was the defense of the European political model. She emphasized that democracy, the rule of law, and institutional stability are long-term advantages of Europe, which are often underestimated in geopolitical analyses that focus exclusively on military power.
Kallas also tried to shift the debate from perception to real capabilities, pointing out that Europe bears a significant burden in supporting Ukraine – financially, humanitarianly, and militarily. In doing so, she effectively argued that Europe’s role in the West’s security architecture is structural, not secondary.
The "solidity" of the European Union will not be measured by replicas, but by other yardsticks
When the two performances are analyzed together, a subtle rhetorical dissonance emerges – Rubio presented a conciliatory and cooperative framework, while Callas reacted defensively to narratives of European weakness. This suggests that despite the formal unity around Ukraine and security, beneath the surface there is still a struggle for a geopolitical narrative and for positioning Europe as an equal, rather than a peripheral pillar of the Western alliance.
But the "strength" of the European Union will not be measured by the two speeches, but primarily by whether the EU member states will manage to build a single strategy and response to the determined request of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for his country to be urgently admitted to the Union, and only then to negotiate on meeting the standards and criteria for admission.
It is no coincidence that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio will meet with the leaders of Slovakia and Hungary immediately after the Munich Security Conference. Rubio is scheduled to meet with the state leadership in Bratislava on Sunday, February 15, and his mini Central European tour ends in Budapest with a meeting with Viktor Orban on Monday, February 16. In addition to Washington's goal of strengthening ties with Central European countries, especially those that often have different positions within the EU, it is important to note that Fico and Orban are more Eurosceptic and sometimes closer to more moderate positions towards Russia than the belligerent rhetoric of Kallas or NATO leaders.
It is also very important that Slovakia and Hungary are reserved towards the idea of an “urgent” or accelerated entry of Ukraine into the European Union. Orbán strongly opposes the rapid integration of Ukraine into the EU, emphasizing that such a move could bring war to Europe. Budapest has repeatedly argued that Ukraine does not meet the economic, institutional and legal criteria for membership and that any rapid enlargement would have serious budgetary and agrarian consequences for the current members. The Hungarian government also links the issue to the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and to broader criticism of the EU’s sanctions and security policy.
The Slovak position is more complex and fluid, and there is no doubt that the government in Bratislava also expresses reservations about accelerated procedures and politically motivated enlargement. Prime Minister Robert Fico has repeatedly emphasized that enlargement must remain a process based on criteria, not geopolitical impulse.
No one supports Zelensky's demand for "EU accession first, negotiations later"
To this should be added the fact that Poland, a country that is one of the strongest and most consistent supporters of Ukraine's European integration, including for an accelerated accession process, nevertheless does not insist on formal "instant membership" by bypassing the procedures, but on a politically accelerated and strategically prioritized accession process. Analysts do not fail to emphasize that Poland, although politically supporting Ukraine's integration, in practice has serious disputes with Kiev over agricultural products, market competition, and transport.
At this point, virtually no EU member state officially promotes a “membership first, then meeting the criteria” model for Ukraine. There is a political bloc that promotes “maximum accelerated” or “geopolitical priority” admission, which in media discourse is often interpreted as a de facto shortened process. The most vocal advocates for accelerated accession for Ukraine are the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Czech Republic, Sweden and Finland also treat Ukraine’s candidacy as a strategic project of the Union, but they also insist on reforms in that country, especially in the areas of corruption and the judiciary.
Finally, it is crucial that the most powerful Western European powers – Germany, France, the Netherlands – are clearly against the idea of immediate accession without fulfilling the criteria. Their position is that any political shortening of the process would undermine the credibility of the enlargement and create a precedent for other candidates from the Western Balkans region.
In practice, the most radical formula circulating in political debates is “gradual integration before membership” – for example, access to the single market, funds or security mechanisms, while negotiations are ongoing. This is a compromise model that is gaining more and more attention in Brussels.
Can Europe defend itself, without help from the US – in five to ten years, maybe…
Rubio's speech in Munich and his meetings in Bratislava and Budapest should also be seen in the context of the preparations of the Donald Trump administration for the next round of peace talks in Ukraine. Although Kallas's remark in Munich reminded of the EU's bellicose rhetoric in supporting Ukraine in the war with Russia, the fact is that in Brussels too, voices of reason have been heard more and more often lately, i.e. acceptance of geopolitical reality, according to which Europe could defend itself alone, without support from the United States, from the "strategic enemy" Russia, but not now, but only after five to ten years. Strategic studies estimate that this much time and very serious investments are needed for Europe to replace the critically important American military infrastructure on the old continent. Without the Americans on European soil, Europe is practically without a nuclear umbrella, without strategic aviation and without global logistics.
The US now had more than 40 military bases and military locations in Europe, 31 of which were permanent bases, and the others were additional garrisons, missile systems, airfields, warehouses… The largest concentration of this infrastructure was in Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Poland and Romania. This meant that the US had a practically permanent military infrastructure along the entire European security axis – from the Arctic (Greenland) to the Black Sea and to Turkey.
The number of US troops in Europe varies from 80.000 to 100.000, but it should be emphasized that before 2022, this number was from 60.000 to 65.000. After the start of the war in Ukraine, US troops in Europe have been reinforced with 20.000 new soldiers. Analysts are unanimous in assessing that this is the largest US military presence in Europe since the end of the Cold War. This should be added to the fact that America has 90 to 130 nuclear warheads in Europe, deployed mainly in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey and partly in the UK in a wider system). The potential in strategic aviation (F-15, F-16 and F-35, as well as B-52 strategic bombers, aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic as part of the US Sixth Fleet, command architecture, strategic transport, satellite intelligence, logistics, etc.) should not be underestimated.
In the coming days, it will be seen whether, after the extended hand at the Munich Security Conference and Kaia Kallas' sharp retort, the most powerful European countries will try, together with the Trump administration, to put pressure on the warring parties to sit down at the negotiating table and finally reach an agreement, or whether Europe will continue to hesitate between recognizing the obvious fact that the transatlantic presence is a pillar of its security (as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte will also admit) and forcing rhetoric that means fueling Zelensky's hopes that Ukraine will be admitted to the European Union without negotiations and then all of Europe will somehow be at war with Russia.
